Edict — Multi-Agent Department Org

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First TalentDelta packaging at pinned commit 14a207557719 (2026-05-06). Upstream paths deliberately NOT shipped: docs/Agent_video_Pippit_20260225121727.mp4, docs/demo.gif, docs/screenshots — regenerable demo media (about 49 MB) that pushed the archive past the 20 MB upload ceiling; the written docs stay. Every other file is byte-identical to the pinned commit, a provenance record is appended to README.md, and the packaging secret scan found no live credentials. Also not shipped: scripts/linucb_router.py and scripts/agentrec_advisor.py, which upstream stores as absolute symlinks into the author's own home directory (/Users/bingsen/...) — they are dangling on any other machine and would leak a third party's local path.

Review: Decision: APPROVED — edict-multi-agent-org v1.0.0 ([internal reference removed]), decided 2026-09-30 19:41:41Z Uploader / notice recipient: [internal reference removed] — the file's only credit (position 0, role 'scouted') and the version's uploader, so the two agree; the address is internal (@talentdelta.ai), which the notice path skips by design, so no external party is mailed. WHAT WAS CHECKED, AND HOW - Bytes: fetched from our own store (scripts/review-lane/blob-fetch.cjs) by the stored object hash, not through the customer download door. sha256 1ff524a319491eefe29228200fc32b3ab3cfe0e7821d0a6c80cf32c62ffaab8c · 640,307 B — matches FileVersion.blobId→Blob.contentHash and the uploaded size exactly. - Provenance, verified by fetching the commit rather than trusting the pack: the tree was compared path-by-path and byte-by-byte (git blob sha1, mode + content) against a clean clone of cft0808/edict sitting at the disclosed pin 14a207557719. Result: 184 files identical, 1 differing (README.md), 0 added, 38 not shipped. The pinned clone's HEAD is 14a207557719, matching the pin named in the change note and the README append; zero symlinks ship. - The one differing file is README.md, and the difference is purely additive: upstream's README text is a byte-prefix of the shipped file, whose extra bytes are the appended provenance record (upstream URL, licence, pin, runtime note, and the list of what was not shipped). - Removals are exactly the disclosed set: the two absolute symlinks `scripts/linucb_router.py` and `scripts/agentrec_advisor.py`, the demo video `docs/Agent_video_Pippit_*.mp4`, `docs/demo.gif` and the files under `docs/screenshots/` (38 paths in all). Every not-shipped path falls inside those categories; zero undisclosed removal. - Licence: MIT — openclaw-sansheng-liubu contributors (2026). Licence text ships; the terms match the claim. - Taxonomy: 4 skill slugs, all storable leaves: ai_ml_engineering/agent_orchestration/{multi_agent_coordination,role_assignment,task_decomposition,agentic_workflow_orchestration}; domain technology/artificial_intelligence/ai_agents — each verified against the pinned snapshot apps/web/src/lib/taxonomy/oasf-1.1.0.json (tag v1.1.0, commit f510be0d4b58, 513 skills / 201 domains): node exists, category=false, no children. - Secrets: the lane's own packaging reader plus an independent secret-shaped scan over every text member. No live credential. Findings and adjudication: * Reader verdict BLOCKED: 52 blocking findings, every one a host-path match. 36 lines carry the upstream author's real workspace path `/Users/bingsen/.openclaw/…` — 19 in `docker/demo_data/agent_config.json`, 17 in `docker/demo_data/live_status.json` — and the pack's own Dockerfile injects exactly those files into the image. The other 16 are documentation examples (`docs/remote-skills-*.md`), a code comment naming path patterns (`scripts/kanban_update.py`), and end-to-end fixtures that feed a path in and assert it is stripped (`tests/test_e2e_kanban.py`), plus two lines of the forbidden-example rule in `agents/taizi/SOUL.md`. * Adjudicated NOT blocking: the path belongs to the public upstream repo's own demo data, not to this packaging; it is not a credential and not client or private material. It does matter to the record: the change note explains the exclusion of the two symlinks by the path leak they would carry, and does not say the same path still ships in the demo data the pack's Dockerfile injects into the image. The demo config's workspace fields therefore point at a directory that exists only on the author's machine (the container-correct config `docker/demo_data/openclaw.json` and the `agents.json` template with `<YOUR_USER>` placeholders do ship). * `edict/alembic.ini` carries a literal postgres password for a localhost dev database; it equals the dev default declared in the pack's own `docker-compose.yml` and CI workflow, so the append's 'credentials-shaped values are declared sample placeholders' holds. Not a live credential. * 45 in-pack references resolve to files that do not ship; every one resolves into the disclosed `docs/screenshots/`, `demo.gif` or the `.mp4` — matches the append. * Counts verified against the bytes: 12 agent `SOUL.md` files (twelve roles), `README.md`/`README_EN.md`/`README_JA.md`, Python backend, web dashboard and Docker Compose present as the summary states. WHAT I COULD NOT CHECK - The live install-test (an unattended run through the download door on a test identity) was not run for this pack; the byte read proves packaging, not that the pack does its job on a stock host. - Delivery: the decision notice goes to an internal address, which the platform skips by design (skipped=internal_recipient) — there is no external recipient to confirm receipt. VERDICT: approved. The bytes are upstream's at the pin, the removals are the disclosed ones, the licence and taxonomy check out, and nothing private, client-owned or live is in it. (2026-09-30)